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1. Introduction and Motivation.
The contribution of fiscal policy to restoring economic growth has waxed and waned 
since the onset of the global economic growth. After an initial burst of fiscal stimulus 
in 2008 and 2009, many governments retrenched, turning to austerity policies from 
2010. While some detect a revival of fiscal activism during the past year (Davies 2016, 
Ip 2016), monetary policy has been the principal tool of macroeconomic policy in many 
G-20 nations. 
If fiscal policy has been so muted—at least in terms of spending levels and contribution 
to national income growth—then is there little to say about the impact of public 
procurement policies during the crisis era? Not necessarily. By altering the relative 
treatment of domestic bidders for state contacts vis-à-vis their foreign rivals, changes 
in public procurement policy can shift expenditure across borders.  
Given that many governments’ expenditures on goods and services amount to large 
shares of national income, the potential redirection of demand could have significant 
implications for the fortunes of internationally-active firms, the employment prospects 
of their staff, the value for money in state contracting, international trade and 
investment flows and, should matters become contentious, for trade disputes.  
Even in countries where fiscal policy has not been expansionary, changes in public 
procurement policies can have important implications for cross-border commerce and 
therefore become a legitimate area for commercial policy discussions. The criticism—
and latter copy-catting—by foreign governments of early crisis-era policies to impose 
stringent “Buy America” provisions in the US fiscal stimulus package speaks to the 
potency of this matter.  
From an economic point of view, public procurement policies can distort the allocation 
of resources and alter conditions of competition in bidding for state contracts. 
Arguably, there is also a legitimate societal concern that, in the desire to favour one 
group of bidders over another, the total cost of state purchases increases. In this 
manner, public procurement policies may act as a largely hidden form of redistribution 
from current and future taxpayers to narrow sectoral interests. 
But what changes have governments made in public procurement policies during the 
crisis era? Apart from members of the Agreement on Government Procurement (GPA) 
of the World Trade Organization (WTO), whose public procurement policies are briefly 
summarised in that organisation’s Trade Policy Reviews, there are few sources on 
changes in regulations and laws governing public purchasing. For sure, during the 
past two years a number of data collection efforts have begun and these are to be 
welcomed.  
So as to ground deliberations to greatest extent possible in facts, the proximate 
purpose of this paper is to summarise the contents of the independent Global Trade 
Alert (GTA)’s initiative to collect data on government procurement policy changes 
since November 2008. This effort sought to identify policy changes that improved as 
well as worsened the treatment of foreign commercial interests in state purchasing 
policy. In total, 548 announced changes to public procurement policies have been 
identified by the GTA team.4 
4 Consistent with the goal of promoting evidence-based deliberations on public policymaking, the GTA 
provides this data free of charge to third parties. Please contact Simon Evenett at 
simon.evenett@unisg.ch for this data. As the description of the GTA’s data collection efforts makes 
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The ultimate purpose of this paper is to inform other, ongoing data collection efforts, 
public policy deliberations on crisis-era policy response as they relate to fiscal policy 
and public procurement policy in particular, and discussions on the relative merits of 
strengthening disciplines on public procurement matters in trade agreements. 
Although a plurilateral accord on government procurement matters was agreed in the 
1970s, compared to other areas of international trade policy, negotiations and 
international obligations on public procurement matters remain relatively speaking a 
nascent area. Notwithstanding the adoption of government procurement obligations in 
many regional trade agreements during the past twenty years, some levels of 
government (in particular sub-national levels) and certain areas of expenditure tend 
not to be covered by such disciplines at all.  
The implication is that there is plenty of room for expanding trade disciplines in this 
area of public policy. Whether governments are minded to do so is a separate matter. 
All of these matters, including assessments of the likely economic and commercial 
impact of potential disciplines, can surely be constructively informed by information on 
what steps governments have actually taken during an era of acute economic pain 
followed by growth underperformance.  
No doubt some are eager to learn about the trade impact of crisis-era public 
procurement measures. Notwithstanding certain economic models showing that under 
specific circumstances that government procurement discrimination against foreign 
bidders has no effect on aggregate trade flows (see Evenett and Hoekman 2005 for 
an account of the relevant issues), it would seem from the reaction of business people 
and policymakers that foreign changes in state purchasing policy appear to have 
cross-border implications.  
We too are keen to learn what those effects may have been, but note that to the best 
of our knowledge we know of no empirical paper that separately identifies the effects 
of government procurement policy changes since the onset of the global economic 
crisis.5 Analysts cannot run before they can walk. Data must be collected before 
econometric analysis is possible. Some may find the delays frustrating—but in our 
opinion this reflects the parlous state of data collection on non-tariff measures when 
the global economic crisis hit.  
Worse, we fear that the near empirical vacuum on high quality data on non-tariff 
measures at the beginning of the global economic crisis may have been exploited by 
some analysts, interest groups, and public officials to dismiss outright the subsequent 
                                                          
clear, the number of procurement measures documented rises over time and the GTA is happy to share 
updates of this data as well. 
5 Evenett and Fritz (2015a) did include public procurement policy changes into one of the categories of 
potential trade distortions that could affect the exports of the Least Developed Countries (LDCs). As of 
this writing, there are 19 entries in the GTA database whereby a harmful public procurement policy 
change has been implemented since November 2008 that affects products exported by the Least 
Developed Countries. It may be useful to note at this point that over the same time horizon, 925 
government policies harmful to the commercial interests of the Least Developed Countries have been 
implemented. It is for this type of reason, and others, that Evenett and Fritz did not emphasise the role 
of foreign public procurement policy changes as a major factor holding back LDC exports during the 
crisis era.   
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importance of crisis-era non-tariff measures in general and, in this case, changes in 
public procurement law and regulations.   
Instead of econometric estimates, here we report statistics on the amount of exports 
by the Group of Twenty leading economies (G20 nations) that are in product 
categories where adverse foreign public procurement policy changes have been 
implemented since November 2008. These statistics provide some sense of the scale 
of this public policy “problem” across countries and over time. Researchers may find 
these numbers of use in identifying the bilateral trade flows where public procurement 
policy changes might have had the largest effect. Inevitably, progress in this area on 
data, empirical analysis, and implications for policymaking is incremental. Still, in this 
paper we hope to contribute to a better understanding of crisis-era policy response in 
state purchasing. 
The remainder of this paper is organised as follows. In section 2 the GTA data 
collection initiative is described and discussed in manner that facilitates a better 
understanding of the statistics reported in later sections. Those engaged in data 
collection efforts on procurement policy may find the observations in this section of 
interest. Section 3 summarises the evidence in the GTA database on the resort to 
government procurement discrimination and liberalisation since November 2008. 
Implications for policy deliberation, data collection efforts, and research are drawn in 
section 4.  
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2. Data collection on public procurement measures by the Global Trade Alert.6 
When the extent of what was to become known as the global financial crisis became 
clearer in late 2008 and early 2009 concerns grew that governments might resort to 
beggar-thy-neighbour activities, just they had after the onset of the Great Depression 
in the 1930s. G20 Leaders, at their first crisis-era summit in November 2008 in 
Washington DC, vowed they had learnt the lessons of history and declared they would 
eschew protectionism.7 Several international organisations were tasked by G-20 
Leaders with monitoring trade- and investment-related policy decisions and periodic 
reports were published. For our purposes, it is worth noting that none of these 
international monitoring reports gives public procurement measures much 
prominence.8 
More generally, one concern that arose immediately was that no organisation was 
collecting data on the wide range of policy measures that governments could use in 
the 21st century to discriminate against foreign commercial interests, taken to be not 
just traders but also investors, foreign workers, and foreign owners of intellectual 
property rights. Given that protectionism has a bad name and that governments face 
substantial pressures to protect domestic commercial interests during sharp global 
downturns, the possibility that governments would “innovate” and deploy less well 
known tools of discrimination against foreign commercial interests could not be 
discounted.9  
Concerns compounded when it became apparent that the WTO secretariat had 
adopted a particularly narrow, historically-motivated view of its monitoring mandate. 
That United Nations agencies had made so little progress in nearly 50 years in 
defining, classifying, and collecting data on non-tariff measures—initiatives that many 
involved contended were stymied by national governments—reinforced fears that 
when times are tough the public international organisations would not be able to 
effectively monitor their own members.  
Such concerns led to the creation of the Global Trade Alert, which is based at the 
University of St. Gallen, Switzerland, and was launched under the aegis of the Centre 
for Economic Policy Research (CEPR), the Europe-wide network of researchers 
whose headquarters is in London, United Kingdom. A major objective of the Global 
Trade Alert is to document and make available information on changes in government 
policy that are likely to have altered the relative treatment of domestic vis-à-vis foreign 
                                                          
6 If it is not apparent already—after all, the title page of this paper indicates Evenett’s links to the Global 
Trade Alert—it is should be stated that one of the authors of this paper has been heavily involved in the 
design, execution, dissemination, and financing of this initiative. 
7 In fact, the relevant summit communiqué was more specific, identifying certain trade policies 
governments would eschew. Since this communiqué statement was non-binding and given the 
possibility that governments might have meant something different from this statement than what could 
be inferred by third parties, there is little to be gained by declaring whether or not eschewing 
discrimination in public procurement fell within the spirit or the letter of this communiqué’s remarks on 
protectionism.  
8 Having said this, the latest report by the WTO Director-General on developments in the world trading 
systems refers specifically to six government procurement-related policy changes undertaken by G-20 
governments from mid-October 2015 to mid-May 2016. See WTO (2016). 
9 Indeed the experience of the 1980s—when a sharp global economic downturn was followed by 
substantial resort to voluntary export restraints rather than the import quotas and tariffs of the 1930s—
was disquieting.  
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commercial interests since 1 November 2008, the month that the G20 Leaders first 
met in crisis mode.  
That information has been made available on a searchable public website10, which 
itself adds to the transparency of the world trading system. Such information has been 
used to evaluate government—in particular G20 government—policy stance. 
Increasingly, the data collected in this initiative is being used in analyses of trade policy 
development and international commercial flows.11 Given the focus of this paper on 
public procurement matters it is important to state that the range of policies reported 
in the GTA database is wider. 
To better understand the GTA database it helps to differentiate between four matters: 
policy scope, unit of analysis, data collection, and classification of reported measures. 
Each is addressed in turn below. 
 
Policy scope 
An important point of differentiation between the GTA and the official reports on 
protectionism is that—at least as far as their “headline” numbers are concerned—the 
latter confine themselves to a specific set of policy instruments. This has, as implied 
above, the disadvantage that governments may deliberately choose policy 
instruments that fall outside the scope of official monitoring. To avoid this problem, the 
GTA has always focused on likely changes in the relative treatment and not on a 
specific set of policy instruments.12  
Specifically, the GTA will include information on any policy change—no matter the 
instrument used—that alters the relative treatment of domestic firms vis-à-vis foreign 
rivals. The changes could in principle favour as well as harm foreign commercial 
interests—hence the GTA is not only looking for examples of “bad news” (that is, 
looking for harmful measures.) Moreover, the GTA considers policy changes at all 
levels of government, although the focus in reality has tended to be more on central 
and on first sub-national tiers of government. 
Given that the GTA’s monitoring relates to policy announcements made since 1 
November 2008, the information in the GTA database can best be thought of as 
capturing the unanticipated changes in policy stance since 1 November 2008. Policy 
changes that were announced before 1 November 2008 but were implemented 
afterwards are not included in the GTA database because an informed private sector 
party could have anticipated the policy change.  
In the language of economists, the GTA tries to capture the “flow” of policy change 
rather than the “stock” of policies in force on 31 October 2008. This is important for 
interpretational reasons—it may be that two governments implemented identical public 
procurement measures, but one did so after 1 November 2008 and one just before1 
November 2008. Only the former measure would be recorded in the GTA database, 
                                                          
10 www.globaltradealert.org 
11 As of this writing, the term “Global Trade Alert” is mentioned in 1,010 distinct entries in the Google 
Scholar database.  
12 In a recent evaluation of different methods of tracking crisis-era protectionism, the Swedish National 
Board of Trade endorsed the relative treatment—or discrimination-based—approach to identifying 
relevant policy variables (Sweden 2016).  
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yet given the extraneous information mentioned directly above, in the policy context in 
question it might be unwise to condemn the former and praise the latter. 
Despite the relative treatment standard, with the goal of monitoring as best as possible 
policy intervention motivated by liberalisation or strategic advantage, early on the GTA 
team decided not to report the  
 negotiation or formal implementation of regional trade agreements13,  
 implementation measures following the timetable established in a WTO accession, 
 implementation of technical barriers to trade and sanitary and phytosanitary 
standards14, 
 foreign policy-induced sanctions15, 
 measures associated with free trade zones, 
 measures involving international commerce below de minimus levels. 
Some have contended that, as a result of its broader coverage of policy instruments, 
it is no wonder that the GTA finds more harmful measures than in official reports. Since 
the policy instruments covered by the latter are also covered by the GTA, it is possible 
to undertake apples-for-apples comparisons between different data sources. The last 
such comparison was undertaken in November 2015 and published in the 18th GTA 
report (Evenett and Fritz 2015b, chapter 12.) Depending on the metric used the GTA 
finds between 57% and 250% more instances of protectionism than the WTO 
secretariat over the same time frame. 
Although in principle the GTA includes information on any government policy affecting 
the relative treatment of domestic firms, policy instruments are grouped together into 
over 20 categories in the database (which facilitates sorting the database, allows for 
targeted searches of the database, and computation of specific summary statistics.) 
Given the focus of this paper, it is worth noting that public procurement measures are 
separated into three categories in the GTA database: measures that require a certain 
level of local sourcing or hiring, measures conferring price preferences or other 
preferences on domestic bidders, and other (not otherwise specified, n.e.s.) public 
procurement measures.  
 
Unit of analysis: an announcement of government intervention 
Governments often include information on multiple policy interventions in a given 
policy announcement, such as a state budget speech before a legislature. This poses 
a problem for those monitoring changes in policy stance. If one chopped up each such 
announcement and made the unit of account in the database a single government 
policy intervention, then the database would be swamped by a small number of 
announcements of multiple interventions.  
Alternatively, if the unit of analysis is an announcement then in some circumstances it 
will make sense to distinguish between the announcement itself and the different 
                                                          
13 Suspension of regional trade agreement provisions or attempts to manage trade between members 
of a regional trade agreement are included if it can be argued that the private sector was genuinely 
surprised by the announcement. 
14 Cases where it can be demonstrated on the basis of the available public record that a government 
has misused these measures to favour domestic firms are included in the GTA database. 
15 Counter-sanctions are included on the grounds that the sanctioned country chose to hit back with a 
commercial policy measure. 
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policy instruments associated with the announcement. This alternative approach was 
taken by the GTA team—a point worth bearing in mind as some public procurement 
measures have been announced at the same time as other government measures. 
Given the products and sectors of the economy implicated by each government 
intervention may differ, then when using the GTA database it is important to remember 
that counts of the total number of announcements need not correspond to total number 
of government policy interventions, total number of products implicated, and total 
number of times a sector has been affected etc.16  
It is for this reason that some users have not been keen on statistics based on the total 
number of announced measures—and why the GTA team reports different summary 
statistics extracted from their database and why ultimately the GTA team began 
computing the share of national exports likely to be facing foreign policy instruments 
of different types. Obviously the summary statistic used should reflect the research or 
policy question at hand. The view taken by the GTA team has to been to generate the 
richest dataset possible that enables analysts to extract the underlying data or 
summary statistic that best suits their current purpose. 
 
Data collection  
An important operational principle for the GTA team is to support, as far as is possible, 
each report on a government announcement with information from official sources, 
taken to include sources published by the government in question (which may be 
online) or information published by public international organisations. Other sources 
of information may be taken into account but as many facts as possible are to be taken 
from official sources. 
For each potential entry in the GTA database, information is collected on: 
 The identity of the government body making the announcement. 
 The date of the announcement and any dates when announced measures come 
into effect or lapse. 
 The policy instrument referred to in the announcement. 
 The stated rationale for the policy change. 
From this information, the following are obtained: 
 Whether the measures in the announcement have an inception date (date when it 
was first implemented). 
 Whether each measure’s duration is finite. 
 Whether each measure is still in force. 
 When the measure involves trade in goods, which four-digit product categories in 
the UN COMTRADE database is implicated. 
 Which sectors in the UN two digit CPC classification is implicated by the measure. 
 With data on the relevant commercial flows (UN COMTRADE for trade in goods, 
for example) what trading partners are likely to be affected by the implementation 
of the measure. 
All of this information is written up in a pre-specified format and submitted for 
evaluation. Each submission is reviewed twice by senior members of the GTA team. 
                                                          
16 The relevance of this observation will become apparent in the next section of the paper. 
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A submitted measure may be rejected outright, revisions may be asked for, or 
accepted. Only accepted measures are then published on the GTA website. 
The GTA team regularly tracks dozens of government websites across the world—the 
goal to have the best possible worldwide coverage. In addition, the reports of leading 
public international organisations are monitored as well. Certain international law firms 
and national and international business organisations publish information on public 
policies of interest to them and these are consulted for promising leads. Lastly, key 
phrase searches are conducted on Twitter every week and libraries of commercial 
policy-related terms are used to identify other leads. Whenever a lead is investigated 
the primary goal is to find an official source that relates to the matter in question and 
then an independent assessment is made of any related policy announcement. In this 
way, private sector sources are employed without unduly influencing the research and 
evaluation process used by the GTA team. 
Some measures—such as the implementation of an antidumping investigation—pass 
through several stages and the reported GTA measure is updated after every stage. 
Periodic checks of earlier reported measures are undertaken to ensure information is 
as up-to-date as possible. 
These data collection methods have yielded information on literally thousands of 
government policy interventions since November 2008 and the GTA database has, at 
this writing, nearly 10,000 entries. Still, there is no guarantee that every relevant 
measure has been documented. Moreover, the extensive use of the internet to search 
for government announcements begs questions about coverage. Could some 
governments be less transparent than others, especially when they are undertaking 
controversial policies such as protectionism? Do the public sector governance norms 
in some countries give more weight to transparency than others? 
Could countries whose official languages are less well known be under-reported? Do 
some countries make a small number of government announcements involving 
multiple policy interventions or do others make an announcement for almost every 
state intervention? 
These are fair questions to ask and should certainly be borne in mind when interpreting 
summary statistics from the GTA database and for conducting empirical analysis for 
generally.17 
Another important point to bear in mind is that it may take time to successfully complete 
a report on government policy intervention. Moreover, governments may take time to 
report or acknowledge previous state intervention. An important feature of the GTA’s 
methods is to keep looking for announcements of government intervention made on 
or after 1 November 2008 even though such announcements may have taken place 
up to eight years ago. In contrast, the monitoring by international organisations 
focuses only on the most recent six-month interval and does not update its earlier 
published totals in light of evidence found at a later date. As the most recent report of 
the Global Trade Alert has shown, the protectionist record of the G20 countries during 
the crisis era is much worse once updating is undertaken (Evenett and Fritz 2016).  
Another key implication is that very recent totals of instances of government 
protectionism and liberalisation tend to be sharply revised up over time---therefore, 
                                                          
17 If an analyst suspects that the GTA’s coverage of policy intervention varies across countries, then 
one might consider weighting observations by the total number of interventions (of all types) in the GTA 
database.  
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falling totals of recorded protectionism in the most recent quarters or years should not 
be read as indicating necessarily less resort to beggar-thy-neighbour activity. Anyone 
seeking to report on government procurement policy changes in “real time” ought to 
bear this observation in mind. 
 
Classification of reported measures 
As the relative treatment standard is used to determine whether an announcement 
should be included in the GTA database, given that treatment of foreign rivals can 
worsen or improve, it makes sense to classify government announcements depending 
on their likely effect on foreign commercial interests.  
For the sake of the following argument, assume that a government announcement 
refers to a single state intervention. If the implementation of that measure would 
benefit foreign commercial interests then the measure is classified green (as in a traffic 
light system.) If a measure is implemented and almost certainly harms foreign rivals 
then it is classified red. If a measure is implemented and likely harms foreign 
commercial interests then it is classified amber. The introduction of the amber 
classification allows for some doubt about a measure’s effects or about the sources 
supporting a reported measure.  
Perhaps confusingly the GTA team also reports measures that have yet to be 
implemented and are likely to be harmful (or worse) as amber.18 Therefore, users of 
the GTA database should distinguish between amber measures where the state 
intervention in question has been implemented (in which case there is an inception 
date in the published report on the measure) and where the intervention has not been 
implemented. This distinction is easy to make in the Excel spreadsheets that the GTA 
team sends to users requesting data. 
When the GTA reports refer to protectionism they refer to implemented amber and red 
measures. When the GTA reports refer to liberalising measures this refers to 
implemented green measures. 
When a government announcement involves more than one instance of state 
intervention then it is possible that some interventions are liberalising and others 
protectionist. How to colour code these measures? In cases where each intervention 
has the same effect on the relative treatment of foreign commercial interests, then the 
overall colour code reflects that. However, in cases where the relative treatment is 
mixed across interventions, the measure is classified amber.19  
One implication is that users of the database should pay particular attention when 
using information on measures involving multiple state interventions that are coded 
amber and implemented. It may be that the state intervention that a researcher is 
particularly interested has a different impact on the relative treatment of foreign 
commercial interests than the overall colour coding of the measure suggests. 
 
The purpose of this section has been to describe the construction and implementation 
of the GTA database. That database now includes 9,741 published reports on 
                                                          
18 These measures are included in the GTA database as some users want an “early warning” system, 
that is, information on policy intervention has been announced yet whose implementation is still to come. 
19 The GTA will soon have a new website where each policy intervention is colour coded. 
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government announcements. As of this writing, 150 more measures are in the review 
process. During the past three years, approximately 2,000 new reports have been 
published each year. In contrast, the WTO’s Trade Monitoring Database contains a 
total of 3,831 measures of government interventions taken during the global economic 
crisis.20  
Given the focus in this paper on public procurement-related measures, it is worth 
noting that at the time of this writing the GTA database contains 548 reports on 
government announcements that involve at least one measure relating to state 
purchasing laws or regulations. In contrast, the WTO’s Trade Monitoring Database 
includes 51 entries which refer to “procurement.” Twelve of those 51 entries refer to 
public procurement-related initiatives undertaken by the United States. 
20 This WTO database can be accessed at http://tmdb.wto.org/searchmeasures.aspx?lang=en-US 
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3. Public procurement policy change during the crisis era: Evidence from the
Global Trade Alert database.
The GTA database includes reports on 507 public procurement-related measures that 
were implemented from November 2008, though not all of these measures are 
currently in force. 
Figure 1: Evolution of all reported, implemented public procurement-related 
measures, by year of implementation. 
Figure 2: Evolution of all reported, implemented public procurement-related 
measures over time by GTA classification. 
Figure 1 shows the imposition of public procurement-related measures over time and 
suggests a constant, though somewhat declining trend, with a peak in 2009. This said 
the GTA database reports these measures with a lag, so the fairly high numbers 
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reported in 2014 to 2016 are a worrying sign, especially given that the “red” 
discriminatory measures constitute the overwhelming majority of all reported 
measures in any given year since 2009 (see Figure 2).  
The United States is responsible for 351 of the 507 measures (69.2% share of the 
total) that were imposed since November 2008. The distribution of the remaining 
30.8% of all measures, shown in Figure 3, reveals that Brazil, Russia, Indonesia, India 
and Kazakhstan have also used these measures extensively. Eight countries’ 
governments have implemented five or more public procurement measures since the 
global economic crisis. All but one of these eight countries are G-20 members.  
 
Figure 3: Public-procurement related measures imposed in countries other than 
the United States. 
 
Figure 4: Discriminatory procurement measures imposed countries other than 
the US.  
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The distribution of the discriminatory (i.e. red and amber colour coded) procurement 
measures also reveals the dominance of the US - of all discriminatory procurement 
measures (n = 479), most (n = 328, of which “red” = 325) have been imposed in the 
US. The distribution of the remaining 151 measures imposed in the non-US countries, 
shown in Figure 4, mirrors that shown in Figure 3. 
By measure type, public procurement localisation measures account for the majority 
of discriminatory procurement measures imposed both in the US (277 out of 328, of 
which “red” = 276) and in non-US countries (84 out of 151, of which “red” = 66). The 
distribution of the latter is reported in Table 1. 
Table 1: Discriminatory procurement measures imposed by countries other 
than the USA, by type of measure. 
In terms of the implementation status, more than half (51.8%) of US discriminatory 
procurement measures (n = 328) that had been imposed are not in force.  In contrast, 
126/151 of non-US discriminatory procurement measures are currently in force. These 
distributions, by GTA classification, are shown in Figures 5 and 6, respectively. In both 
cases, there is plenty of crisis-era procurement discrimination to be unwound. 
Type of measure Amber Share (%) Red Share (%)
Bail out / state aid measure, Export incentive, Public procurement localization 1 0.8
Bail out / state aid measure, Public procurement localization 1 3.6 2 1.6
Bail out / state aid measure, Public procurement localization, State trading enterprise 1 0.8
Bail out / state aid measure, Public procurement preference, Trade defence measure (AD, CVD, safeguard) 1 0.8
Export incentive, Investment measure, Localization requirement, Migration measure, Public procurement localization 1 3.6 0.0
Import tariff, Investment measure, Non tariff barrier (not otherwise specified), Public procurement localization 1 0.8
Import tariff, Public procurement localization 1 0.8
Investment measure, Localization requirement, Public procurement localization 1 0.8
Investment measure, Public procurement, nes 0.0
Non tariff barrier (not otherwise specified), Other service sector measure, Public procurement localization 1 0.8
Non tariff barrier (not otherwise specified), Public procurement localization 1 0.8
Public procurement localization 18 64.3 66 53.7
Public procurement localization, Public procurement preference 2 1.6
Public procurement localization, State-controlled company 2 1.6
Public procurement localization, Sub-national government measure 1 3.6 1 0.8
Public procurement preference 4 14.3 35 28.5
Public procurement preference, State-controlled company 5 4.1
Public procurement, nes 3 10.7 2 1.6
Total 28 100.0 123 100.0
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Figure 5: Distribution of US discriminatory procurement measures by current 
implementation status. 
 
 
Figure 6: Distribution of non-US discriminatory procurement measures, by 
current implementation status. 
 
 
Looking next at liberalising (or “green” colour-coded) measures (n = 28), the majority 
of these (82%) have also been implemented in the US and the overwhelming majority 
(89.3%) are still in force.  
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Figure 7: Distribution of liberalising procurement measures, by country and 
current implementation status. 
 
 
The majority (64.3%) of “green” procurement measures are also public procurement 
localisation measures and most took effect in 2014-2015 (see Table 2). 
 
Table 2: Distribution of “green” procurement measures by type of measure and 
evolution over time 
 
 
The UN CPC sectors affected most often by procurement measures in the GTA 
database are 41-42 (basic metals and fabricated metal products). These sectors have 
been affected by 123 implemented public procurement-related measures.  
Of the measures affecting these sectors: 
• Nearly all (122 measures) have been imposed by the US 
• Nearly all (120 measures) are public procurement localisation measures 
• All (123 measures) are classified as discriminatory by the GTA 
• Less than half (56 measures) are currently in force 
• Nearly a quarter (30 measures) have been imposed in 2016; 17 were imposed 
in 2009 
3
1 1
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Indonesia Kyrgyzstan Russia USA
No Yes
Type of measure 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016
Investment measure, Public procurement, nes 1 1
NTB (nes), Public procurement localization, TBT 1
Public procurement localization 1 1 4 7 4 1
Public procurement localization, Sub-national government measure 1 3
Public procurement, nes 1 1 1
Total 1 1 1 2 5 8 9 1
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• Nearly three-quarters (88 measures) were in stay for two years 
• More than 90% (111 measures) affected Brazil, Canada, China, France, 
Germany, India, Italy, Japan, Mexico, South Korea, Russia, Sweden, and the 
United Kingdom.   
 
The countries most frequently affected (n = 156) by procurement measures in the GTA 
database are Brazil, Canada, China, France, Germany, India, Italy, Japan, Mexico, 
South Korea, Russia, Sweden, and the United Kingdom.  
Of all measures affecting these countries, 
• All (156 measures) have been imposed by the US. 
• All (156 measures) are public procurement localisation measures. 
• All (156 measures) are classified as discriminatory by the GTA. 
• Less than half (66 measures) are currently in force. 
• Nearly a fifth (30 measures) have been imposed in 2016; whereas 23 measures 
were imposed in 2009. 
• More than 80% (125 measures) were in force for two years. 
 
Counts of measures give a sense of the frequency of resort to discrimination in public 
procurement, but not to the scale of the trade affected. To precisely identify the latter 
one needs information on state purchases from foreign suppliers at the detailed 
product level. Unfortunately, such data is not available. However, data on a nation’s 
total purchases from all foreign sources at the product level is available and, carefully 
interpreted, this might be useful. 
Some products are only bought by state bodies, especially in sectors where there are 
large government monopolies. For example, if the sole supplier of railway services in 
a country is the national rail company, then it is quite likely—if not almost certain—that 
the state is responsible for the total national imports of locomotives.  
Moreover, if the state expands markedly the number of products covered by a 
restrictive procurement regulation then at a time when global trade is growing very 
slowly—if not stagnant as the global trade volume numbers since January 2015 
suggest—then the expansion in the total amount of imports in product categories 
affected by procurement discrimination is more likely to be due to the policy change 
than to changes in private sector sourcing patterns.  
It is for these reasons that we took advantage of calculations made during the 
preparation of the 20th Global Trade Alert report (Evenett and Fritz 2016) that reveal 
the exposure of each G20 country’s exports to foreign public procurement 
discrimination. For that report, at the four-digit product level every bilateral trade 
relation where a discriminatory public procurement measure was in effect in a given 
year was identified. The trade associated with each of these bilateral product-level 
trade flows was identified and the date a measure came into effect used to weight 
each trade flow (such that, if a measure was only in effect in December 2012 then only 
a twelfth of the annual trade flow data for 2012 was used in the subsequent 
calculations.) 
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For each year between 2009 and 2015, taking into account when discriminatory public 
procurement measures came into effect and (where relevant) lapsed and that only 
some trading partners implement such discrimination, in the preparation for that report 
the percentage of each G20 nation’s exports in products where procurement 
discrimination was calculated. These calculations were based only on discriminatory 
public procurement policy measures implemented since November 2008. Therefore, 
any legacy of pre-crisis procurement discrimination would add further to these 
numbers. 
These numbers are reported in Figure 8, which shows the percentage share of G20 
exports potentially at risk through discriminatory public procurement policies in 2009 
(dark blue bars) and the change in these exposure shares between 2009 and 2015 
(light blue bars).  
Figure 8 suggests that Mexico, South Korea, Japan, and China had the highest shares 
of their total exports potentially affected by discriminatory procurement policies in 
2009. In the case of Mexico and South Korea, the exposure shares were above 10%. 
In contrast, Saudi Arabia had almost none of its exports potentially at risk through 
discriminatory public procurement policies, which may not be terribly surprising given 
its export mix. Argentina, Russia, Italy and Australia also reported low exposure shares 
(less than 1%) in 2009. 
Interestingly, Mexico, Canada, Japan, South Korea and China reported the largest 
increases in their respective exposure shares over from 2009 to 2015. Significantly, 
Argentina, Australia, UK and US, all of which had low exposure shares in 2009, had a 
lot more of their exports potentially affected by discriminatory procurement policies in 
2015. 
  
Figure 8: G20 exports (% share, 2009 and change over 2009-2015) potentially at 
risk through discriminatory public procurement policies implemented by 
foreign trading partners. 
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4. Concluding remarks.
This paper has shed light on the resort to public procurement policy change since the 
onset of the global economic crisis. Particular use was made of the Global Trade Alert 
database, which contains over 500 entries relating to changes in state purchasing. 
Having described how this database was constructed and indicated where analysts 
and users need to use the database with particular care, a summary of the principal 
procurement-related findings was presented. 
Some may have been struck by the frequency with which the United States has 
resorted to public procurement discrimination. While it is certainly the case that the 
United States expanded such discrimination at the beginning of the crisis, it should be 
recalled that that country has by international standards a very transparent system of 
government and that it tends to report each publicly offering of state largesse. These 
two factors probably account for the large number of American entries in the GTA 
database. 
Still, the GTA database contains plenty of information on procurement discrimination 
by other nations. Compared to the WTO’s database on crisis-era policy response, the 
GTA database contains information on three times as many instances of non-US 
procurement discrimination. Eight nations other than the United States have 
implemented five or more discriminatory public procurement measures since the crisis 
began. “Buy America” cannot be blamed for all of the procurement discrimination of 
recent years. Addressing such discrimination is a global challenge, especially when 
one realises that seven of the eight of these nations are G20 members. 
That conclusion is reinforced by the growing shares of national exports in product lines 
and to trading partners where public procurement discrimination has been imposed. 
For sure, such data has requires careful interpretation, not least because export 
exposure is not the same as export losses. Still, the fact that the percentages of 
exports exposed to such discrimination is rising quickly suggests that either the 
number of larger nations using such discriminatory tools is growing or that the products 
implicated by such expansion is rising too. Either way, export interests are potentially 
compromised and this may generate a vocal constituency in favour of further trade 
disciplines on state purchasing.  
There is a long way to go, however, between identifying a potentially interest and the 
successful negotiation and implementation of trade disciplines. With better—but 
certainly not perfect—data available, analysis of the impact on trade and investment 
flows can begin. Should detailed price data ever become available, then the impact of 
crisis-era procurement discrimination on the value-for-money that states are getting 
from public purchases could be estimated as well. All in all, in the years ahead the 
prospects are brighter for more evidence-driven deliberation on public procurement 
matters and their implications for the world trading system. 
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